Sovereignty, surveillance and speeding: Considering the Panopticon as a method of policing by Deagon, Alex
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Deagon, Alex
(2015)
Sovereignty, surveillance and speeding: Considering the Panopticon as a
method of policing. In
International Crime, Justice and Social Democracy Conference, 9-10 July
2015, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Qld. (Unpublished)
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/93775/
c© Copyright 2015 The Author(s)
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
Crime, Justice and Social Democracy Conference 2015 
 
Mr Alex Deagon 
Lecturer, Faculty of Law 
Queensland University of Technology 
alex.deagon@qut.edu.au 
Policing, Security and Democratic Freedoms 
Individual Paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Sovereignty, Surveillance and Speeding: Considering the Panopticon as a Method of Policing 
 
This paper argues that the Panopticon is an accurate model for and illustration of policing and 
security methods in the modern society.  Initially, I overview the theoretical concept of the 
Panopticon as a structure of perceived universal surveillance which facilitates automatic 
obedience in its subjects as identified by the theorists Jeremy Bentham and Michel Foucault.  
The paper subsequently moves to identify how the Panopticon, despite being a theoretical 
construct, is nevertheless instantiated to an extent through the prevalence of security cameras as 
a means of sovereignly regulating human conduct; speeding is an ordinary example.  It could 
even be contended that increasing surveillance according to the model of the Panopticon would 
reduce the frequency of offences.  However, in the final analysis the paper considers that even if 
adopting an approach based on the Panopticon is a more effective method of policing, it is not 
necessarily a more desirable one. 
 
 
 
 
Good morning everyone.  I’d like to begin with a simple question, and you can feel free to just 
consider it in your minds.  Who here has been caught speeding before, and had to pay a fine?  I’ll 
be honest and confess that I have.  For those of you who have, I wonder how many of you were 
caught by a speed camera – blissfully unaware, until one day you received that letter in the mail 
with the picture and the fine.  As someone who has regrettably done that before, the whole 
experience leaves a rather sour taste in one’s mouth.  I don’t really remember whether I was 
speeding or not, but the speed and the location cited seemed plausible to me, and so I was willing 
to pay the fine.  However, it’s the method of enforcement that really got me thinking.  We all 
know that law regulates human conduct through instruments such as the police, but the rise of 
modern technology and the nature of modern society has produced a new phenomenon: 
sovereign regulation by surveillance.  Ever since I was caught speeding by this camera, I have 
been much more conscious of the fact that my speed could be recorded by a camera at any point, 
and this has resulted in me being more conscious in regard to obeying the speed limit – all 
without a single interaction with a police officer or any other kind of legal authority. 
 
In this paper, I will consider a framework for this type of policing method, known as the 
‘Panopticon’.  I want to suggest that the Panoptic model, where constant surveillance 
programmatically instils obedience in the subject, is an accurate description of sovereign 
surveillance in the modern society, and may even be a very effective method of policing and 
enforcement.  However, I also want to argue that even if the Panopticon is an effective method of 
policing, it may not necessarily be one we want to pursue – particularly in a democracy.   
 
The notion of the Panopticon was originally developed by Jeremy Bentham.  It was actually an 
idea of architecture, a building plan designed to regulate its inhabitants.  Bentham proposed that 
this Panopticon, or inspection-house, would be applicable for all purposes of inspection.1  He 
argues that  
the more constantly the persons to be inspected are under the eyes of the persons who 
should inspect them, the more perfectly will the purpose of the establishment have been 
attained.  Ideal perfection, if that were the object, would require that each person should 
actually be in that predicament, during every instant of time.  This being impossible, the 
next thing to be wished for is, that, at every instant, seeing reason to believe as much, and 
not being able to satisfy himself to the contrary, he should conceive himself to be so.2 
 
In other words, Bentham considers the plan or structure of the Panoptic establishment to be such 
that it persuades the inhabitants that they are always being watched or inspected.  As a 
consequence, they will always obey the laws of the inspection-house for fear of being punished.  
If the inhabitants know they are being watched but do not know whether they are being watched 
at any specific time, then they will obey at all times to ensure they will never be caught.  
Bentham then proceeds to outline the architecture of the Panopticon.  The building is circular, 
with the cells containing the prisoners occupying the circumference.  The cells are divided from 
one another and no prisoner can see or hear any of the others, or the inspector.  The inspector’s 
apartment is in the centre so that they may see all the prisoners, and the prisoners may see the 
inspector.3  The essence of the plan consists in the centrality of the inspector such that they can 
see the prisoners without being seen.4 
                                                            
1 Jeremy Bentham, ‘Panopticon, or, the inspection-house, &C’ in Eugene McLaughlin et al (eds), Criminological 
Perspectives: Essential Readings (SAGE, 2003 2nd ed) 25. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid 25-27. 
4 Ibid 27. 
Bentham notes that the persons inspected should always feel as if they are under inspection, and 
the best way of achieving this is if they are actually being inspected for the greatest proportion of 
time possible, and they have an awareness of this.5  For Bentham, the advantages of this plan are 
manifold.  In particular, there is the apparent omnipresence of the inspector, in conjunction with 
the frequency of their real presence.  This will ensure the compliance of the prisoners and any 
subordinate inspectors.  The separation of the prisoners from each other will also ensure there is 
no communication between the prisoners, either for information regarding the inspection or for 
the purposes of concocting an escape.6  Although originally conceived as a localised building, 
Bentham envisages the Panopticon as a new way of regulating all of society.  Therefore, he says, 
by this ‘simple idea in architecture’,  ‘the gradual adoption and diversified application of this 
single principle’ will result in ‘morals reformed, health preserved, industry invigourated, 
instruction diffused, public burdens lightened, economy seated as it were upon a rock’ – ‘a new 
scene of things… over the face of civilised society’.7 
 
Michel Foucault takes Bentham’s idea and describes how it is characteristic of the modern 
society, and in particular how it displays the disciplinary mechanism of a sovereign state 
regulating its citizens through universal surveillance.  He generally observes: 
 
 
                                                            
5 Ibid 28. 
6 Ibid 29-30. 
7 Ibid 31. 
This enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which the individuals are 
inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised, in which all 
events are recorded, in which an uninterrupted work of writing links the centre and 
periphery, in which power is exercised without division, according to a continuous 
hierarchical figure, in which each individual is constantly located… all this constitutes a 
compact model of the disciplinary mechanism.8   
 
Foucault subsequently contends that Bentham’s Panopticon is the architectural figure of this 
composition.9  In the Panopticon, each individual is seen but does not see, ‘he is the object of 
information, never a subject in communication’.10  This invisibility is the guarantee of order as 
there is no danger of collusion or collective plans to escape or defeat the inspector; the collective 
effect of a crowd is abolished and replaced by separated individualities which can be numbered 
and supervised.11  ‘Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of 
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power’.12   
 
Importantly, the surveillance is permanent in its effects even if discontinuous in its action – the 
perfection of power is to render its actual exercise unnecessary, to separate the exercise of power 
from the one who exercises it, and instead cause the subjects themselves to bear the relation of 
power.  The one who is knowingly subject to this field of visibility assumes responsibility for the 
constraints of power, becoming the principle of their own subjection.13  This power should be 
visible in the sense that the inmates can always see the central tower from which they are being 
watched; it should be unverifiable in the sense that the inmates should not know whether they are 
                                                            
8 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Pantheon, 1977) 197. 
9 Ibid 200. 
10 Ibid 200. 
11 Ibid 201. 
12 Ibid 201. 
13 Ibid 201-203. 
being watched at any particular moment, but they are conscious that they may always be so.14  
The Panopticon therefore automatises and disindividualises power; any individual may operate 
the machine for any purpose.  ‘In order to be exercised, this power had to be given the instrument 
of permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance, capable of making all visible, as long as it 
could itself remain invisible’.15  As Foucault puts it, ‘a real subjection is born mechanically from 
a fictitious relation’.16  
 
In its purposes and applications, the Panopticon is not merely limited to an inspection-house for 
prisoners.   
The Panopticon… must be understood as a generalizable model of functioning; a way of 
defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men… whenever one is dealing 
with a multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behavior must be 
imposed, the panoptic schema may be used.17     
 
Bentham envisaged a ubiquitous surveillance running through society, and the Panopticon 
provides the formula for this generalisation; it allows, ‘at the level of an elementary and easily 
transferable mechanism, the basic functioning of a society penetrated through and through with 
disciplinary mechanisms’.18  Foucault argues that this panoptic ‘disciplinary-mechanism’ is a 
‘design of subtle coercion for a society to come’ consisting of a ‘generalised surveillance’ spread 
throughout the whole social body.19    This culminates in the state control of the mechanisms of 
                                                            
14 Ibid 201. 
15 Ibid 214. 
16 Ibid 202. 
17 Ibid 205. 
18 Ibid 209. 
19 Ibid 209. 
discipline through a centralised police force which surveys and regulates all aspects of society.20    
The Panopticon consequently makes possible the perfection of the exercise of state power by 
reducing the number of those who exercise it and increasing the number of those on whom it is 
exercised, acting to prevent crimes before they occur, and acting directly on individuals without 
the need of physical force.21  Ultimately, Panopticism constitutes ‘the technique, universally 
widespread, of coercion’.22  
 
I claim in this paper that our modern society is heading in this Panoptic direction.  Examples of 
surveillance as a means of state control are manifold.  Security cameras generally are designed to 
prevent crime before it happens as a function of the fact that the surveillance increases one’s risk 
of being caught and subject to punishment.  We have, for example, red light cameras which 
capture moments where drivers fail to stop at a red light.  The primary example I wish to focus 
on, though, is speeding and speeding cameras.  As one drives, one is conscious of the fact that 
there are speeding cameras.  These may either be fixed speeding cameras, or cameras directly 
controlled by police officers.  These cameras are often hidden, although there are occasions 
where they are explicitly advertised.  Presumably, the idea is that these cameras will somehow 
minimise the incidence of speeding. 
 
Let us examine this idea within the framework of the Panopticon, and briefly evaluate its 
correspondence and also the effectiveness of its explicit implementation.  Recall that the 
                                                            
20 Ibid 213. 
21 Ibid 206. 
22 Ibid 222. 
Panopticon induces obedience by producing in the subjects a constant awareness that they are 
being watched, without knowing specifically whether they are being watched at any particular 
point.  They will always choose to obey to avoid the punishment that will result from them being 
caught.  Speed cameras arguably fulfil the function of a society-wide Panopticon in a number of 
ways.  The presence of signs indicating that speed cameras are operational and speed limits are 
enforced produces awareness of visibility in the motorist, but the fact that some speed cameras 
are not advertised means unverifiability in that the motorist is not aware when precisely their 
speed is being recorded.  In this way, speeding offences are prevented before they occur by 
persuading motorists to keep to the limit on pain of potentially being recorded at any given time.  
Eventually, motorists will keep to the speed limit automatically, even if all speeding cameras 
were removed without motorists knowing.  This, at least, was my own personal experience – 
after realising that my speed could be recorded at any time and speeding limits correspondingly 
enforced, I became conscious that I needed to obey these speed limits in case there was a speed 
camera in the vicinity. 
 
This perspective was also reflected in an extremely primitive empirical survey.  I conducted a 
poll among my facebook friends on this issue.  Now obviously, this survey has very limited 
potential.  It’s not really an accurate cross-section of age, demographics, socio-economic status, 
religious views and so forth, all of which may affect the outcome.  It’s essentially anecdotal 
evidence, but it does indicate a trend.  I posted this as a facebook status: 
 
 
FACEBOOK POLL FOR RESEARCH 
Imagine that all speed cameras are hidden and motorists are not notified of their location or when 
they may be passing one.  When you are driving, would the fact that you could be observed by a 
speed camera at any point without your knowledge make you more likely to keep to the speed 
limit at all times for fear of being caught?  Just answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in the comments and like the 
status for more exposure. 
 
The question could be more refined as well, but it is sufficient for its limited purpose here.  I 
received 46 replies, and 31 of these were ‘yes’ or ‘maybe’, which is about two-thirds or 67%.  So 
there is a significant trend which suggests that if the Panoptic method were implemented in this 
sense, it would be quite effective.  More sustained research, and in particular a detailed policy 
and empirical analysis, needs to be done to ascertain whether these findings are more 
systematically reflected in Australian society.  If they are, the argument that the Panopticon is an 
effective method of policing would be a compelling one.  However, when a method of policing is 
chosen, mere instrumental effectiveness or efficiency is not the only consideration.  The 
Panopticon model may well be an effective model of policing.  But the more pertinent question 
is whether the Panopticon is a method that is acceptable in a democratic context, and compatible 
with the good of democratic governance. 
 
 
 
The trademark of democratic regimes is government by the people, for the people.23  In this 
sense, elections are usually, though not necessarily, features of democratic governance.  More 
generally, a democracy involves a process where the people have a causal role (participate) in the 
construction of law and policy, and the actual makers of law and policy are responsible to the 
people.24  In other words, the people governing and/or participating in the political process is a 
feature of democracy which distinguishes it from tyrannical or authoritarian regimes which 
impose their will on the people without their participation or consideration; the government is 
not accountable to its people and its processes are not transparent for the purposes of public 
contribution.  As Borowiak notes, ‘governance without accountability is tyranny.  Few principles 
are as central to democracy as this.  It is an idea that runs throughout the history of democratic 
thought…’25(3)  Democracy can therefore be viewed as a ‘core value’ or social good in the sense 
that it promotes accountability and transparency in the exercise of state power.26 
 
The notion of accountability in democracy has enormous normative importance.27  Democratic 
accountability as a value reflects a wider set of democratic values, such as political equality and 
freedom.28  This is because non-democratic regimes which are not accountable to their citizens 
can impose arbitrary laws which unfairly discriminate between people, in conjunction with 
excessive measures which unduly restrict freedom to maintain state control of the people. 
Accountability consequently requires visibility and transparency, ‘a line of sight’, and the most 
                                                            
23 Manfred Schmidt, ‘Political performance and types of democracy: Findings from comparative studies’ (2002) 41 
European Journal of Political Research 147, 147. 
24 Thomas Zweifel, International Organisations and Democracy: Accountability, Politics and Power (Lynne Reiner, 
2006) 14-15. 
25 Craig Borowiak, Accountability and Democracy: The Pitfalls and Promise of Popular Control (Oxford, 2011) 3. 
26 Zweifel, above n 24, 1-2. 
27 Borowiak, above n 25, 3. 
28 Ibid 7. 
intractable problems of accountability occur when the exercise of power is invisible, diffuse, 
systemic and otherwise unidentifiable.29 
 
The description of the Panopticon seems to directly contradict this definition of accountability.  
Part of the advantage of the Panoptic structure for Foucault is that the subjects have no line of 
sight and cannot see when they are being watched; they only know that they are watched at 
potentially any time.  Moreover, Foucault’s description of the culminated Panopticon in society 
corresponds almost perfectly to the circumstances where accountability is problematic: in the 
Panopticon, the exercise of power is invisible, diffuse, systemic and unidentifiable.  This distinct 
lack of accountability could be marshalled as an argument that the Panopticon is incompatible 
with democracy. 
 
It seems that Foucault was aware of this kind of objection, because he contends that despite its 
systemic and invisible power, the Panoptic system is nevertheless subject to inspection by both 
appointed inspectors and members of the public.   
There is no risk, therefore, that the increase of power created by the panoptic machine 
may degenerate into tyranny; the disciplinary mechanism will be democratically 
controlled, since it will be constantly accessible “to the great tribunal committee of the 
world”… the exercise of power may be supervised by society as a whole.30 
 
In other words, Foucault says, the Panopticon is compatible with democracy because it is itself 
subject to inspection and accessible to the public; it is supervised by and therefore accountable to 
                                                            
29 Ibid 9. 
30 Foucault, above n 8, 207. 
the people.  However, there are problems with this conception.  Foucault’s claim may be true of 
a localised Panopticon of the type conceived by Bentham – an inspection-house which is limited 
in time and space.  The problem of accountability does not seem to be addressed where, as 
Foucault and even Bentham acknowledge, the Panopticon extends to regulate the entire society.  
In this arena, which is in fact conceptualised by both Bentham and Foucault, of ubiquitous 
surveillance permeating the entire society, no one is outside of the surveillance process.  So there 
is no external democratic society to supervise the exercise of power.  It is not enough to simply 
respond that the government which controls the Panopticon is democratically elected and 
therefore the Panopticon is supervised in this way, through the normal democratic process of 
representation.  As has been manifested historically, it is relatively easy for a democratically 
elected government to govern in a tyrannical and opaque way which denies democracy due to a 
lack of accountability. 
 
Ultimately, though it may well be effective, the Panopticon model facilitates obedience by 
coercion and fear of punishment, as opposed to a perspective which promotes obedience because 
it is right.  In particular, the model contravenes the democratic right or ‘good’ of accountability 
and transparency, which by definition facilitates tyranny.  Foucault implicitly acknowledges this 
much by stating that the panoptic machine may degenerate into tyranny if it is not democratically 
controlled.  Therefore, we should resist the move to panoptic constant surveillance, and instead 
promote transparency, accountability and obedience as a social good. 
 
 
